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IMPORT AND EXPORT WITH THE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Recent Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Cases Involving the Republic of
China: A Harbinger of Things to Come?
RONALD A. CASS*
INTRODUCTION: TRADE CASE FILINGS AGAINST THE ROC
Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 allows the United States to
impose additional duties on imports from a particular country if cer-
tain criteria are met. The country must be either dumping-selling
the product at lower prices in the United States than abroad--or sub-
sidizing imports. This practice must cause, or threaten to cause, ma-
terial injury to a domestic industry, or materially retard the
development of a domestic industry.' Two federal agencies, the De-
partment of Commerce and the United States International Trade
Commission ("ITC" or "Commission") share the authority to make
this determination. The Department of Commerce, part of the execu-
tive branch of the government, is responsible for determining whether
dumping or subsidization has taken place. The ITC is an independent
agency that assesses whether the dumping or subsidization has re-
sulted in the requisite injury. The trade law terms those practices that
produce injury "unfair trade practices."
The United States has proceeded against nearly all of its major
trading partners for dumping and against many of them for subsi-
dizing. Thus, it is not surprising that such cases ocassionally involve
products imported from the Republic of China ("ROC"), since it is
the fourth largest source of United States imports. The volume of
dumping and subsidy cases involving the ROC, however, is surpris-
ingly high despite the amount of trade between the United States and
the ROC. During the time I served on the Commission, there were
* Dean, Boston University School of Law, Boston, Massachusetts. Mr. Cass was for-
merly the Vice Chairperson of the United States International Trade Commission. Thanks are
due to Stephen Narkin for his generous assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673 (1988).
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about as many cases involving imports from the ROC as cases involv-
ing imports from all of the European Community countries
combined.
Recent cases heard by the Commission, on the surface, provide
few clues to explain the large volume of cases against the ROC. The
cases do not seem to concentrate on any given type of import. Those
cases involving products from the ROC cover a wide range of technol-
ogies and industries. For example, some of the dumping and subsidy
cases involve expensive products embodying relatively advanced tech-
nology which are produced by large industries, such as steel pipes and
tubes and business telephone systems. Yet other cases involve such
products as martial arts uniforms and residential door locks, which
are relatively inexpensive, technologically unsophisticated, and are
produced by industries that are small by any standard. The variety of
cases involving the ROC, in other words, accurately reflects the vari-
ety of dumping and subsidy cases against products from all exporting
countries.
To understand the large number of cases involving the ROC, it is
first necessary to gain a general understanding of what prompts the
filing of these unfair trade cases. Although determining why cases are
brought is not an easy task, several explanations are discernible.
The simplest explanation is that the number of filings corre-
sponds to the number of cases with merit. Dumping and counter-
vailing duty (subsidy) petitions are filed when there exists a strong
basis for believing that products are sold at lower prices in the United
States than in the exporting country or are subsidized by foreign gov-
ernments, and that these practices are injuring competing United
States businesses. Under this view, cases should be filed most fre-
quently against products from nations with significant impediments to
competition (and/or strong export-promotion programs) and prod-
ucts that most significantly affect competing United States industries.
The characteristics likely to describe the set from which dumping and
subsidy cases are brought include substantial government involve-
ment in the economy of the exporting country, large shares of the
United States market for the particular imported product, and im-
ported products that are quite similar to those made in the United
States. Each factor increases the likelihood that the "unfair" practice
is, in fact, occurring, or increases the probability that the practice will
noticeably affect United States industry. For example, impediments
to competition in a foreign country increase the probability that prices
1990]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L[.
for products sold there will be high, relative to prices for the same
products in the United States.
I do not know enough about the ROC's economy as compared to
the economies of other United States trading partners to predict
whether this straightforward explanation of unfair trade case filings
also explains the volume of cases against ROC products. Nonethe-
less, based on my familiarity with the workings of government, litiga-
tion in general, and trade cases in particular, I suspect that things are
not quite so simple. Given the assumption that case filings fit some
rational expectations model, there surely will be some correlation of
filings to expected outcomes. However, outcomes may not be fully
derivative of the simple description of merits (a subject addressed
more below) and the gains from filing unfair trade cases may not be
confined to formal disposition of the immediate case. The very fact
that the proportion of cases generating affirmative findings by the ITC
varies over time at least suggests that case filings do not conform to a
strict monotonic function of the probability of ultimate success on the
merits. This would make alternative hypotheses worth pursuing.
Two alternative explanations focus on dynamic factors. These
alternatives suggest that dumping and subsidy case filings are a func-
tion of changing patterns of imports and domestic production, with
significant deviations from historic patterns in either country likely to
increase filings. If change is the impetus of petitions for relief from
the effects of these trade practices, then two explanations for trade
cases are possible. Looking at the import-supply side, the countries
most rapidly gaining market share in the United States would be the
most likely targets of dumping and subsidy investigations. Another
explanation is that the petitions may be filed in response to declines in
the particular United States industry. Such cases would logically be
brought against the principal sources of imports competing with the
declining industries, although, as described below, other competing
suppliers are apt to be swept into these actions as well. Thus, the
countries most subject to complaints would be those that compete
more with the declining United States industries than with the grow-
ing or stable sectors of the United States economy.
There is some basis for believing this last hypothesis. Antidump-
ing and countervailing duty petitions do seem to correlate, after a
slight lag, with economic recessions. Additionally, they seem to be
filed disproportionately against products competing with United
States businesses that are on the decline. Moreover, the manner in
[Vol. 13:1
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which some of my former colleagues at the ITC have approached
dumping and subsidy cases increases the likelihood that the fortunes
of United States industry (without respect for whatever congeries of
causes determine those fortunes in a given case), rather than the prac-
tices of particular trade partners, will significantly influence case fil-
ings. These commissioners have read the statutory instruction under
which the ITC decides unfair trade cases-to determine whether the
relevant United States industry is suffering "material injury by reason
of" the dumped or subsidized imports-as if it contained two sepa-
rate, independent instructions: (1) to decide whether the complaining
United States industry is financially healthy or is in decline, and (2) to
determine whether imports have any effect on the industry.2 As ex-
plained further below, this approach allows the changing fortunes of
the domestic industry to dominate resolution of trade cases, which
might well influence the incidence of case filings.
PREDICTING FUTURE FILINGS: POLITICS, BUSINESS, AND LAW
If United States industry performance, wholly apart from export-
ers' trade practices, is at least partially responsible for determining
which trade cases get filed, what does that suggest about filings
against the ROC? When viewed in combination with the two other
factors, industry performance does not provide a strong basis for pre-
dicting the volume of trade cases. Rather, it merely provides a basis
for guessing what to expect of future trade cases against ROC imports
to the United States.
Before attempting to specifically predict the future of ITC cases
involving the ROC, however, I should provide one caveat. In general,
one should view predictions of the future course of United States
trade law and policy with skepticism. In the 1980s, for example, we
have seen a confluence of economic and political developments few
would have predicted. The United States has experienced unprece-
dented economic expansion during peacetime under a presidential ad-
ministration more openly committed to free-market principles than
any in half a century. Yet, the range of domestic industries enjoying
some form of protection against imports expanded considerably over
2. In a number of cases, I have explained why I believe that this approach is fundamen-
tally at odds with United States law and with this country's obligations under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. See, e.g., New Steel Rails from Canada, USITC Pub. 2217,
Inv. Nos. 701-TA-297, 731-TA-422 (Final) (Sept. 1989) (dissenting views of Vice Chairperson
Cass). For sharply contrasting opinions, see id. (views of Commissioners Eckes and Rohr).
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this same period under the same administration. Having made some
predictions in print before, I am especially uneasy about venturing my
guesses in a form that risks later comparison with actual events.
Nevertheless, for the moment, I will try to suppress my custom-
ary caution and suggest that the coming years may see more, rather
than fewer, antidumping and countervailing duty cases involving im-
ports from the ROC. I do not believe that the recent flurry of such
cases is mere happenstance. In my view, two factors have contributed
substantially to the proliferation of antidumping and countervailing
duty cases against the ROC.
One such factor is that the ROC is part of the emerging family of
economic powers known as the "Asian Tigers." The significance here
is that the ROC is an Asian nation with a rapidly expanding economy
and a sizeable volume of exports, largely to the United States. This
statement conflates three related factors: the geographical locus of the
ROC, the ROC's economic growth, and its volume of exports. None
of these factors correlates directly with the explanation for trade case
filings given above. Certainly, I do not profess that any of these fac-
tors, alone, principally explains petitions against products from the
ROC, but the three taken together describe a set of considerations
that is not entirely irrelevant to case filings and outcomes. There has
been much recent discussion in the United States of the perceived
threat of Asian imports. The main focus of this discussion has cen-
tered on Japan, but other Asian exporters, including the ROC, have
received attention as well. Imports from Asia have been discussed in
strident terms, creating an overall climate in which many members of
the United States business community believe that government deci-
sion-makers and policy-makers are more inclined to restrict Asian im-
ports than imports from European Community countries or Canada.
For this reason alone, some United States businesspersons may con-
clude that this is a particularly opportune time to attempt to use the
dumping and countervailing duty laws to restrict import competition
from the ROC.
The second factor likely to keep the number of case filings
against ROC products high concerns a technical aspect of United
States trade law that makes countries more vulnerable to trade sanc-
tions for even modest and inadvertent trade violations. Such practices
include selling products in the United States markets in which the
foreign products have already seriously affected United States busi-
nesses. Under United States law, an antidumping or countervailing
[Vol. 13:1
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duty case need not be brought solely against imports from a single
country. Such an action is often brought against imports from many
countries at the same time. Moreover, in such a multi-country pro-
ceeding, the impact of imports from each country is not usually con-
sidered in isolation. Imports from all countries subject to
investigation are generally considered collectively to determine
whether, as a group, they have materially injured domestic industry.
The reason for this is that under United States law, in order to deter-
mine whether there has been material injury from "unfairly traded"
imports, the Commission must cumulatively analyze the volume and
effect of imports subject to investigation from two or more countries
3
if such imports "compete with each other and similar products of the
domestic industry in the United States market."
'4
The Commission has generally considered the following four fac-
tors in determining whether the statutory criterion for competition
has been met: (1) the degree of fungibility of imports from different
countries, and between imports and the domestic like product, includ-
ing consideration of specific requirements and other quality related
questions; (2) the presence of sales or offers to sell imports from differ-
ent countries in the same geographical markets as the domestic like
product; (3) the existence of common or similar channels of distribu-
tion for imports from different countries and the domestic like prod-
uct; and (4) whether the imports are simultaneously present in the
market.5 These four factors do not add to or replace the two basic
statutory requirements that imports from different countries are to be
subject to investigation and are to compete with each other and with
the domestic like product. Rather, these factors are used to assess
whether the second statutory requirement is satisfied.
Following this approach, the Commission has found that the
statutory criteria for cumulation has been met in almost all recent
3. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iv) (1988). Under the statute, however, the Commission is
not required to cumulate imports from a particular country if that country's exports to the
United States are "negligible" and have "no discernable [sic] adverse impact on the domestic
industry." Id. § 1677(7)(C)(v).
4. Id. § 1677(7)(C)(iv). The Commission may, but is not required to, cumulate the price
and volume effects of imports subject to investigation for the purposes of determining whether
there is a threat of material injury. See, e.g., Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores de Flo-
res v. United States, 693 F. Supp. 1165, 1171-72 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
5. See Antifriction Bearings (Other than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof
from the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden,
Thailand, and the United Kingdom, USITC Pub. 2185, Inv. Nos. 303-TA-19, 20, 731-TA-391-
99 61-62 (Final) (May 1989) (views of the Commission).
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cases where this issue has been presented. The low threshold for cu-
mulation reflects the statute's suggestion that even a minimal showing
of direct competition between imports from different countries, and
between those imports and the domestic like product, makes cumula-
tion mandatory. Of course, competition cannot be treated as a binary
phenomenon--one that either does or does not exist-but rather is a
continuum of consumer choices on expenditure of finite resources. At
some point, the consumers' decisions can be seen as sufficiently zero-
sum for competition to be deemed "direct," even if the products are
only modestly substitutable. At that point, the Commission will
cumulate, responding to a statute framed in terms of existence rather
than degrees of competition.
The statute's legislative history also significantly colors the Com-
mission's treatment of these cumulation issues. The cumulation pro-
vision was added to the statute in 19846 to express Congress' view that
in multi-country antidumping and countervailing duty investigations,
the Commission should not require that each country's imports by
themselves cause material injury. 7 While Congress was satisfied that
most commissioners were applying the cumulation principle correctly
without explicit statutory authorization or direction, it expressed con-
cern that certain commissioners were imposing unjustified conditions
on the doctrine's use.8 In short, Congress made it clear that cumula-
tion was to be the rule, rather than the exception.
With cumulation, it will often be advantageous for a party bring-
ing an antidumping or countervailing duty action against imports of a
particular product from one country to also make similar allegations
respecting imports of the same product from other exporting coun-
tries. This is true even when the volume of those other imports is
relatively small. For the reasons previously suggested, such action
will increase, even if only marginally, the likelihood of an affirmative
determination. Domestic industry will benefit from an affirmative de-
termination if the antidumping or countervailing order covers more
countries. Furthermore, the only cost of adding countries to an an-
tidumping or countervailing duty petition is the cost of compiling
whatever additional information may be required to support charges
against the additional countries. 9
6. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 3033 (codified as amended
at 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (1988)).
7. H.R. REP. No. 26, 98th Cong. 2d Sess., 27 (1984).
8. Id. at 26.
9. This burden may not be as great as it first appears. The courts have held that the
[Vol. 13:1
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Several cases involving the ROC which have recently come
before the Commission appear to reflect this one-sided cost-benefit
calculation. Perhaps the best example is the recent decision of 12- Volt
Motorcycle Batteries from Taiwan.'0 Since the 1985 filing of the peti-
tion in this case, the Commission has twice reached negative determi-
nations in preliminary investigations."I Both times, the Commission
determined that the domestic industry producing 12-volt motorcycle
batteries was not experiencing or threatened with material injury by
reason of unfairly traded imports from the ROC. 12 In both instances,
the Court of International Trade, the first-stage reviewing court for
such cases, reversed the Commission's finding on the issue of threat of
material injury. In an unusual move, the court did not simply remand
for further ITC consideration but instead ultimately instructed the
Commission to make an affirmative preliminary determination.' 3 The
Commission then instituted its final investigation. Shortly thereafter,
apparently recognizing that the Commission was again likely to rule
against it, the petitioner filed an antidumping petition against imports
of 12-volt motorcycle batteries from Korea, asserting that the Com-
mission was legally compelled to cumulate the volume and effects of
the Korean imports with those associated with the imports from the
ROC. While the Commission agreed that it was required to cumulate
the Korean and ROC imports for the purposes of its material injury
analysis, it again unanimously reached a negative determination.
Thus, the petitioner won the battle but lost the war.
Another case involving the ROC and the cumulation doctrine is
Light- Walled Rectangular Pipes and Tubes from Taiwan. ' 4 The Com-
Commission has a duty to conduct an independent investigation of the allegations set forth in
an antidumping or subsidy petition, irrespective of the evidence that may, or may not, be
advanced by the petitioner. See Budd Co. Ry. Div. v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 997 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1980).
10. USITC Pub. 2109, Inv. No. 731-TA-238 (Final) (Aug. 1989).
11. See USITC Pub. 1654 (Feb. 1985); see also USITC Pub. 2109, Inv. No. 731-TA-238
(Final) (Aug. 1989).
12. In preliminary investigations, the Commission's task under the statute is to determine
whether there is a "reasonable indication" that subject imports have materially injured or
materially retarded the development of a domestic industry, or threatened such injury. See 19
U.S.C. §§ 1671(b), 1673(b) (1988). If the Commission makes an affirmative determination, the
petition goes forward to a final investigation. By contrast, in final investigations, the petitioner
must persuade the Commission that material injury or retardation, or the threat of material
injury in fact exists. See id.
13. See Yuasa-General Battery Corp. v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 1551 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1988).
14. USITC Pub. 2169, Inv. No. 731-TA-410 (Mar. 1989).
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mission reached an affirmative determination by a 4-2 vote in this in-
vestigation, as it did in a companion case involving imports of the
same product from Argentina. 5 The Commission's decision in the
Taiwan case is noteworthy in several respects. Cumulation was criti-
cal to the outcome of this case. Chairman Brunsdale and I found that
the domestic industry producing the steel pipes and tubes at issue was
materially injured by the dumping of the subject imports. Two other
commissioners found only the threat of material injury, although one
of two commissioners also stated that he believed the record evidence
could support a finding of present material injury.' 6 While I cannot
speak for the two commissioners who made an affirmative determina-
tion based on a finding of threat, I can say that the Chairman and I
probably would have reached a different conclusion if we had been
considering only the imports from the ROC.
Due to the relatively low threshold for mandatory cumulation
under the statute, we could not look at the ROC imports in isolation.
We were required to assess cumulatively the volume and effect of im-
ports from Argentina and the ROC. Nevertheless, from my stand-
point, the case was a close one. The share of the domestic market
held by the ROC and Argentine imports was relatively small. How-
ever, other evidence in the record indicated that dumping by the two
countries had a significant impact on prices and sales of the domestic
like product, and hence, on investment and employment returns in
the domestic industry producing that product. The dumping margins
calculated by the Department of Commerce for the various ROC and
Argentine exporters were quite large in some cases, and in context,
suggested a significant effect on prices and sales of domestically pro-
duced steel pipe and tube. As is the case with most steel products,
demand for steel pipes and tubes is quite inelastic and there is a high
degree of substitutability between the domestic and imported prod-
ucts. This evidence was sufficient to compel an affirmative
determination.
TRADE LAW'S LEANINGS: CUMULATION AND CAUSATION
Pipes and Tubes is worth perusing for another reason. Although
the commissioners drew the same conclusion respecting cumulation,
15. Light-Walled Rectangular Pipes and Tubes from Argentina, USITC Pub. 2187, Inv.
No. 73 1-TA-409 (Final) (May 1989).
16. Light-Walled Rectangular Pipes and Tubes from Taiwan, USITC Pub. 2169, Inv.
No. 731-TA-410 (Mar. 1989) (views of Commissioners Eckes and Newquist).
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the Commission's decision in Pipes and Tubes highlights the differ-
ences in the commissioners' understandings of the law governing dis-
positions of the underlying merits, that is, their views respecting the
appropriate analysis for determining whether the requisite material
injury or threat of material injury exists. Two of the commissioners
voting negatively found no material injury because, in their view, vari-
ous indicators of the performance of the industry, such as the overall
level of industry employment, production, and operating income, in-
dicated that the condition of the industry had improved relative to an
"already healthy condition" in 1985.17 The two commissioners who
made an affirmative determination based on a finding of threat em-
ployed a similar analysis, although they reached a different conclusion
respecting the ultimate disposition of the case.' 8
In Pipes and Tubes, then, as in many recent ITC cases, a majority
of commissioners treated the industry's health as the key issue. Four
commissioners made no serious attempt to assess critically the effects
that dumping actually had on the domestic industry. Instead, they
relied on intuitive assessments of rudimentary data regarding trends
in industry performance and product prices. 19
The Commission's resolution of the substantive issues and its
treatment of cumulation may prove important to other ROC cases
before the Commission. 20 Two important cases, pending at the time
this paper was delivered, involve imports of small business telephone
17. Id. (dissenting views of Commissioner Lodwick and additional and dissenting views
of Commissioner Rohr).
18. Id. As previously noted, Commissioner Eckes suggested that the evidence "could
support" a finding of material injury. See id. (views of Commissioners Eckes and Newquist).
Commissioner Newquist's findings on this issue, if any, were left unclear. Id.
19. With the possible exception of Commissioner Lodwick, these commissioners are gen-
erally hostile to using economic analysis in antidumping and subsidy cases.
20. It should also be noted that in two other recent cases, the Commission reached nega-
tive determinations respecting unfairly traded imports from the ROC. This occurred even
though the Commission cumulated the volume and effects of those imports with those associ-
ated with imports from several other countries for the purposes of analyzing the existence of
actual material injury. In Industrial Belts from Israel, Italy, Japan, Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and West Germany, USITC Pub. 2194, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-293,
731-TA-412-19 (May 1989), the Commission decided by a 4-2 vote that dumped imports of
industrial belts from the ROC were not causing or threatening material injury to any domestic
industry. (By a 3-3 vote, however, the Commission rendered affirmative determinations with
respect to many of the other subject countries. I voted in the negative as to all subject coun-
tries.) In Thermostatically Controlled Appliance Plugs and Internal Probe Thermostats
Therefor from Canada, Japan, Malaysia and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 2152, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-
292, 731-TA-400, 402-04 (Final) (Jan. 1989), the Commission made a unanimous negative
determination respecting all of the subject countries.
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systems and system subassemblies from Japan, Korea, and the
ROC,21 and imports of sweaters made of man-made fibers from Hong
Kong, Korea, and the ROC.2 2 These cases now have been decided,
and a few comments on them may be in order. Both illustrate the
interplay of cumulation with the alternative substantive approaches to
dumping and subsidy cases.
The Certain Telephone Systems and Subassemblies Thereof from
Japan and Taiwan case is one of the most important to come before
the Commission in recent years. 23 The volume of trade affected by
this publicly visible case is great. The domestic market for small busi-
ness telephone systems is huge, with total sales of equipment for such
systems approaching or exceeding $2 billion annually.
Although the outcome may be affected by the analytical ap-
proach adopted by the Commission, the effect of cumulation in Tele-
phone is unambiguously negative to ROC exporters to the United
States no matter which approach is followed. First, if one attempts to
assess actual economic effects of dumping, cumulation changes two
analytical inputs. Importantly, the volume of imports changes
sharply. Total imports of equipment for these small business tele-
phone systems from all countries that were examined amounted to
several hundred million dollars, even though imports from the ROC
have consistently accounted for only a very small proportion of these
subject imports.
A second parameter affected by cumulation also worked to the
detriment of ROC exporters in Telephone, but its interaction with cu-
mulation does not on average affect the outcome in unfair trade cases.
This parameter is the "dumping margin" (percentage by which the
foreign market price, or its surrogate, exceeds the United States price
for the imports) calculated by the Department of Commerce. In Tele-
phone, the Department of Commerce found that there was dumping
21. Certain Telephone Systems and Subassemblies Thereof from Japan and Taiwan,
USITC Pub. 2237, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-426, 428 (Final) (Nov. 1989); Certain Telephone Systems
and Subassemblies Thereof from Korea, USITC Pub. 2254, Inv. No. 731 -TA-427 (Final) (Feb.
1990).
22. Sweaters Wholly or in Chief Weight of Manmade Fibers from Hong Kong, the Re-
public of Korea, and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 2234, Inv. Nos. 731 -TA-448-50 (Preliminary).
23. The only other case that may be comparable from this standpoint is Antifriction
Bearings (Other than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from the Federal Republic
of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand and the United
Kingdom, USITC Pub. 2185, Inv. Nos. 303-TA-19-20 and 731-TA-391-99 61-62 (Final) (May
1989).
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of the subject imports from all three subject countries. 24 A wide range
of dumping margins was calculated for the various respondents. For
Japanese companies, the dumping margins averaged more than
150%. Because the Japanese respondents elected to withdraw from
the Department of Commerce's investigation, these margins were de-
rived from information provided by the petitioner, AT&T,25 under
the statutory provision allowing the Department of Commerce to
treat AT&T's allegations as the "best information available."' 26 The
dumping margins assigned to the Korean respondents were much
lower, amounting in each case to less than 10%.27 ROC respondent,
Sun Moon Star, Inc., was able to persuade the Department that it was
not guilty of dumping at all. Another ROC respondent, Taiwan Nit-
suko Co., Ltd., however, was assigned a huge margin of 129.73%.
Because Nitsuko failed to provide the Department of Commerce with
certain essential information, the Department also derived the "best
information available" from the petitioner's data.
28
The high margins for several respondents significantly affected
the evaluation of economic effects of dumping by the cumulated class
of respondents. It was not dispositive of the Telephone case for any of
the participating commissioners, but for those commissioners who
saw critical analysis of economic effects as central to the determina-
tion, the margins were of considerable importance. Together with
other information respecting the United States and foreign markets,
the margins suggested that the ability to price differently in the
United States and the foreign (home) markets greatly altered the price
charged for the imported components of telephone systems. 29 Even
though the companies with low margins had little impact on the com-
peting United States industry, the high margin companies arguably
did have an impact. In the end, three commissioners decided that
other information concerning the nature of the competition between
the United States-produced and imported systems reduced the effect
of the lower import prices on the United States industry to a level too
24. See 54 Fed. Reg. 31,978, 31,980, 31,987 (1989) (Japan, Korea, and the ROC,
respectively).
25. Id. at 31,980 (1989).
26. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(C) (1988).
27. 54 Fed. Reg. 53,141-53 (1989).
28. See id. at 31,989-90.
29. See Certain Telephone Systems and Subassemblies Thereof from Japan and Taiwan,
USITC Pub. 2237, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-426, 428 at 270-80 (Final) (Nov. 1989).
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low to be deemed "material injury." 30 These commissioners made it
clear, however, that this was a close judgment.
Even if these commissioners had ruled the other way, the result
could not be ascribed simply to the cumulative assessment of effects of
imports from several nations. Their decision would rest on the com-
bination of: high margins for several companies with high market
share in the United States; conditions that cause those margins to
translate to substantial price declines for the import; competition be-
tween the imported products and the United States-produced prod-
ucts so intense that the lowered import prices significantly affect the
sales and prices of United States-produced products; and the cumula-
tion of several smaller effects into an effect sufficient to be material.
Nonetheless, the cumulative assessment of effects moved the
dumped ROC products from the position of clearly not causing mate-
rial injury to the position of very nearly causing material injury along
with other, cumulated products. Further, cases could arise in which
cumulation increased the perceived effects of dumping from less than
material to more than material injury because it jointly assessed the
effects of a small volume of low margin imports from one country
with the effects of a large volume of high margin imports from an-
other. This could be especially problematic as individual companies'
decisions not to participate in the Department of Commerce investi-
gation could be dispositive, as the decision of the Japanese respon-
dents in Telephone almost was for half the Commission.
This is troubling in no small measure because it allows strategic
considerations to play a serious role in the disposition of trade cases.
The non-participating Japanese respondents, which consequently re-
ceived high constructed margins, assertedly were planning to establish
production facilities for telephone equipment in the United States. If
so, those companies could have decided that a course of conduct
likely to produce high margins would be advantageous, as it increased
the probability that duties would be placed on other imports with
which their (prospectively United States-produced) products would
be competing.
One should note that the relation between cumulation and the
votes of the three commissioners who comprised the plurality in Tele-
phone is less certain. Those commissioners appear to view the assess-
ment of economic effects of the unfair trade practices at issue to be
30. See id. at 101-41 (Chairperson Brunsdale, dissenting), 143-315 (Vice Chairperson
Cass, dissenting), 317-51 (Commissioner Lodwick, dissenting).
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less central to the ultimate judgment. They clearly do not regard the
cumulation of volumes of imports from various countries as irrelevant
to the decision of the case and are sensitive to the increased
probability of material harm that follows from greater import
volumes. Their disposition of trade cases, however, does not show
any clear relation between the outcome and the volume of imports.
And they expressly do not concern themselves with the unfair trade
practice itself, eschewing consideration of the magnitude of dumping
or subsidy in most cases. Indeed, in many cases these commissioners
do not even assess the effects of the unfair trade practice or the im-
ports with which it is associated; they dispose of cases, instead, on the
basis of the current condition (or trend in condition) of the domestic
United States industry, apart from the effects of dumping or subsidi-
zation on that industry. 3' Under these commissioners' approach, cu-
mulation may often be of no consequence.
The other important, recent case where cumulation played a sig-
nificant role is Sweaters Wholly or in Chief Weight of Manmade Fibers
from Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan.32 In Sweaters,
the Commission placed duties on imports totalling about one billion
dollars in 1989. Again, the finding of material injury from dumped
imports was based on the effects of dumped imports from all three
nations. The final decision represented the view of only two commis-
sioners. One commissioner dissented, one was recused, and two seats
were vacant.
The industry in this case is typical of ones that might frequently
generate trade cases, and also is typical of cases in which cumulation
is likely. The United States industry has long been in decline, making
it likely that commissioners who do not carefully analyze the eco-
nomic effects will find the domestic industry injured. The extensive
system of quotas and related restraints assure that no one country is
likely to dominate the market. This raises the probability of com-
plaints against imports from several nations.
31. For discussion of the approach taken by these commissioners, see R. CASS, ECONOM-
ICS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, (Ontario Centre for
International Business Working Paper No. 16, 1989); Cass & Schwartz, Causality, Coherence,
and Transparency in the Implementation of International Trade Laws, in M. TREBILCOCK &
R. YORK, REFORMING TRADE REMEDY LAWS (1990); Kaplan, Injury and Causation in
USITC Antidumping Determinations (March 1990) (unpublished); Morkre & Kruth, 2 DE-
TERMINING WHETHER DUMPED OR SUBSIDIZED IMPORTS INJURE DOMESTIC INDUSTRIES:
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION APPROACH, CONTEMPORARY POLICY ISSUES 7 (1989).
. 32. USITC Pub. 2234, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-448-50 (Preliminary) (Nov. 1989); the Commis-
sion rendered its final decision in September 1990.
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The most significant, visible restraints are those of the Multifiber
Arrangement ("MFA")33 which restricts trade in product categories
covering the sweaters under investigation in that case. The MFA,
originally signed in 1973 by the United States and about 50 other
countries, 34 and subsequently extended three times,35 establishes a
structure under which countries may reach bilateral agreements for
country-specific quotas regulating trade in textiles and apparel to
avoid "market disruption" in the importing nation. Under the MFA,
the United States has negotiated bilateral agreements with more than
40 exporting countries, including the ROC.
36
As one might expect in markets not characterized by highly dif-
ferentiated products and substantial economies of scale, but which do
allow efficient production through large inputs of relatively low-
skilled labor, country-specific quotas have led to considerable disper-
sion of imports across countries. This is visible simply from history.
In the late 1950s, industry concern over imports of cotton fabrics and
blouses from Japan prompted the United States government to press
Japan to establish a five-year "voluntary" program of export con-
trols.37 Imports from other areas, such as Hong Kong, increased sub-
stantially during the time that program was in effect, and the United
States then sought broader controls.38 In 1961, the United States con-
vened a conference of exporting and importing nations which agreed
on controls under the so-called Short-Term Arrangement Regarding
International Trade in Cotton Textiles. 39 A "Long-Term Arrange-
ment" was reached shortly thereafter, and was subsequently extended
twice.40 While cotton import constraints were being expanded "hori-
zontally," imports of textiles and apparel made of fabric other than
cotton had begun to increase. The United States then sought to ex-
pand textile constraints "vertically," and in 1971, the United States
reached bilateral agreements with its larger Asian suppliers (including
Japan, Hong Kong, the ROC, and South Korea) to restrict trade in
33. The text of the MFA is set forth at 25 U.S.T. 1001, T.I.A.S. No. 7840.
34. The Economic Effects of Significant U.S. Import Restraints, Phase 1: Manufacturing,
USITC Pub. 2222, Inv. No. 332-262, 4-4 (Oct. 1989).
35. Id. at 4-1. A protocol recently extended the MFA from July 1986 to July 1991 and
expanded the MFA's coverage to include silk blend and non-cotton vegetable fiber products.
Id. at 4-4.
36. Id. at 4-1, 4-2.
37. Id. at 4-3.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 4-4.
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textiles and apparel made of wool and man-made fibers. 4' These
agreements were viewed as a stop-gap measure, and the MFA soon
followed.
The expansion of MFA-linked restraints-both as to the scope of
coverage and number of countries-illustrates the economic advan-
tage enjoyed by countries with relatively low wage rates in the pro-
duction of textiles and apparel. This story also suggests the strength
of the political forces supporting restrictions on imports of textiles
and apparel into the United States and other industrialized nations.
At some point, the cost of restrictions on such imports to consumers
in industrialized nations may become so great as to tip the political
balance away from such restrictions. Estimates of the current cost of
these restrictions to United States consumers put the figure as high as
$30 billion, and a recent study estimates the overall gain to the United
States economy from elimination of these restrictions as at least $2
billion per year.42 The United States government supports some mod-
ification of the current system, but is not willing to act unilaterally.
One final case which merits discussion is Martial Arts Uniforms
from Taiwan.43 Sales of martial arts uniforms in the United States at
any given time are strongly affected by the extent to which martial
arts movies currently are popular. Because United States interest in
the martial arts has declined over the past several years, 44 domestic
consumption of martial arts paraphernalia has declined. Conse-
quently, the performance of the domestic martial arts uniform indus-
try has weakened considerably.
At the same time, the evidence in the Martial Arts Uniforms case
showed conclusively that dumping had very little, if any, effect on
prices of the subject imports. Similarly, it had little, if any, effect on
prices or sales of domestically produced martial arts uniforms, or in-
vestment and employment in the domestic industry producing that
41. Id.
42. Id. at 4-19. These estimates take into account the gains to domestic consumers that
would result from lower prices for textiles and apparel, losses to domestic producers and em-
ployees in the domestic industry, and lost tariff revenues. Id. at 4-6.
43. USITC Pub. 2216, Inv. No. 731-TA-424 (Final) (Aug. 1989).
44. With all due respect to Chuck Norris, my own view is that martial arts movies just
have not been the same since Bruce Lee passed away. In any event, the level of mass interest in
martial arts clearly has declined somewhat over the past few years and there is nothing at the
moment like the seemingly inexplicable Ninja craze that we experienced several years ago.
The current popularity of the Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles does not appear to have the same
impact on the martial arts uniform market, although I believe it has boosted sales of Turtle
Wax considerably.
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product. In fact, the real source of the difficulties being experienced
by the domestic martial arts uniforms industry can be found in factors
unrelated to ROC imports. In light of this evidence, the Commission
concluded that lower-priced ROC martial arts uniforms did not mate-
rially injure the competing domestic United States industry.
The surprise in this case was not the conclusion, but the tally
that produced it. The Commission rejected duties in that investiga-
tion by only a 4-2 vote, the narrowest of margins by which a negative
vote can be sustained by the ITC when fully conditioned with six par-
ticipating commissioners.45 The outcome of the case is noteworthy,
primarily because it confirms that, in most antidumping and counter-
vailing duty cases, an ailing domestic industry can count on support
from at lease some comissioners without respect to the record evi-
dence on actual effects of unfairly traded imports.
For businesses that export to the United States and compete
principally on the basis of price, this cannot be seen as a favorable
straw in the wind. These businesses may find their susceptibility to an
antidumping or countervailing duty case more dependent on the
health of the domestic United States industry than on any specific
action of the businesses. This approach to deciding international
trade cases reflects a protectionist viewpoint on the part of some of
the commissioners, and contradicts United States objectives of reduc-
ing barriers to trade. It is my hope that the commissioners apply a
more even-handed approach to deciding antidumping and counter-
vailing duty cases in the future, so that ROC and United States busi-
nesses can compete on an even footing.
45. Under United States law, an evenly decided vote is treated as an affirmative vote by
the Commission. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(11) (1988).
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